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Abstract
We deﬁne a logic EpCTL for reasoning about the evolution of probabilistic systems. System states corre-
spond to probability distributions over classical states and the system evolution is modelled by probabilistic
Kripke structures that capture both stochastic and non–deterministic transitions. The proposed logic is
a temporal enrichment of Exogenous Probabilistic Propositional Logic (EPPL). The model-checking prob-
lem for EpCTL is analysed and the logic is compared with PCTL; the semantics of the former is deﬁned
in terms of probability distributions over sets of propositional symbols, whereas the latter is designed for
reasoning about distributions over paths of possible behaviour. The intended application of the logic is as
a speciﬁcation formalism for properties of communication protocols, and security protocols in particular;
to demonstrate this, we specify relevant security properties for a classical contract signing protocol and for
the so–called quantum one–time pad.
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1 Introduction
There are numerous applications in science where reasoning about probabilistic be-
haviour is necessary. In computing, applications include probabilistic algorithms,
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computer modelling and veriﬁcation of probabilistic systems, including communica-
tion protocols with and without security guarantees. The properties of probabilistic
programs in particular have been studied before using many diﬀerent approaches,
and it is widely accepted that the development of formal logics for reasoning about
such programs is highly beneﬁcial, allowing designers and users of systems to for-
mulate properties which the programs may or may not satisfy.
In this paper we describe a temporal probabilistic logic, EpCTL. Our approach
is characterised by the use of an exogenous semantics, such that the models of
state formulas are essentially probability distributions of models of a propositional
logic. We build atop earlier work on the probabilistic state logic EPPL [24] by
introducing a temporal extension; the result is a branching time logic for reasoning
about probabilistic programs. Our intention is to provide a powerful framework
for specifying properties of communication protocols, especially security protocols.
The proposed logic has enough expressive power to allow speciﬁcation of relevant
security properties, and enables high–level reasoning due to the use of an exogenous
semantics.
The exogenous semantics approach [25] involves taking the semantic structures of
a base logic (e.g. propositional logic) and combining them together, possibly adding
new structure, to provide the semantics for a higher-level logic. This approach has
been used to build the probabilistic state logic EPPL and also a logic EQPL for
reasoning about states of quantum information systems. The exogenous semantics
approach can be considered a variant of the possible-worlds approach of Kripke
for modal logic [18], and it is related to the society semantics introduced in [8] for
many-valued logic and to the possible translations semantics proposed in [7] for
paraconsistent logic.
This paper is structured as follows. First we examine the syntax, semantics,
model–checking problem and axiomatisation of the state logic EPPL. We then de-
scribe each of these aspects in turn for the temporal extension, namely the new
logic EpCTL, and provide intuition for the various constructs. Proofs of theorems
have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 Logic of Probabilistic States - EPPL
The state logic of temporal logics like CTL [13], LTL [29] and CTL* [11] is clas-
sical propositional logic. Probabilistic temporal extensions, like PCTL [16], also
use classical propositional logic for state logic. Here we consider quite a diﬀerent
state logic, exogenous probabilistic propositional logic (EPPL) [23,25,9,24], which
was highly inspired by the works of Halpern et al. [15]. Given the envisaged appli-
cation to model–checking, we consider only models over a ﬁnite set of propositional
symbols Φ, which can be understood as Boolean registers (bits) that constitute the
internal state of a protocol or an algorithm. In this setting an EPPL model, that
henceforth we will call a probabilistic structure, is a pair (V, μ) where V is a set of
classical valuations 7 over Φ and μ is a map μ : V → [0, 1] where ∑v∈V μ(v) = 1.
7 Recall that a classical valuation over Φ is a map v : Φ → {0, 1}.
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For a model (V, μ) we call V the set of possible valuations, and μ the probability
measure. Observe that μ can be extended to all valuations by assuming that impos-
sible valuations are improbable, i.e, μ(v) = 0 for any v ∈ V \V where V is the set of
all valuations over Φ. Finally, it will be useful to consider the probability measure 8 ,
where μ is deﬁned over sets of valuations, (V, 2V , μ) and μ(U) = ∑v∈U μ(v) for any
U ⊆ V.
Example 2.1 Consider a variant of the Russian roulette game, where the gambler
tosses a coin and if the outcome is heads, the gun is ﬁred. Assume also that the
gambler has 1/6 probability of shooting a bullet. We describe the system with three
propositional symbols h (heads), b (bullet was shot), d (gambler is dead). The pos-
sible valuations described as sets of propositional symbols are: ∅ (all propositional
symbols are false, the outcome of the coin was not heads); {h} (the outcome of
the coin was heads but no bullet was shot); and {h, b, d} (the outcome of the coin
was heads, a bullet was shot and the gambler is dead). The probability measure is
μ(∅) = 1/2, μ({h}) = 5/12 and μ({h, b, d}) = 1/12.
We continue by describing the syntax of the logic.
2.1 Language
The language consists of formulas at two levels. The formulas at the ﬁrst level,
classical formulas, enable reasoning about propositional symbols. The formulas at
the second level, probabilistic state formulas, enable reasoning about probabilistic
structures. There are also probability terms used in probabilistic state formulas to
denote real numbers. The syntax of the language, expressed using BNF notation,
is as follows.
• Classical formulas
γ := Φ ⊥  (γ ⇒ γ)
• Probability terms
p := 0  1  y  (
∫
γ)  (p + p)  (p p)
• Probabilistic state formulas
ξ := (γ)  (p ≤ p) ⊥  (ξ ⊃ ξ)
The classical state formulas, ranged over by γ, γ1, . . ., are built from the propo-
sitional symbols Φ and the classical disjunctive connectives ⊥ (falsum) and ⇒ (im-
plication). As usual, other classical connectives (¬,∨,∧,⇔) are introduced as ab-
breviations. For instance, (¬ γ) stands for (γ ⇒⊥).
The probability terms, ranged over by p, p1, . . ., denote elements of the reals.
We also assume a set of variables, Y = {yk : k ∈ N}, ranging over the reals. The
term (
∫
γ) denotes the measure of the set of valuations that satisfy γ.
The probabilistic state formulas, ranged over by ξ, ξ1, . . ., are built from the
necessity formulas (γ), the comparison formulas (p1 ≤ p2) and the connectives ⊥
8 Recall that a probability measure is a triple (Ω,F , μ) where F is a σ-algebra over Ω and μ is a measure
where μ(Ω) = 1. Given the ﬁnitary assumption over Φ, in this paper we will always have Ω to be V and F
to be the powerset of V .
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and ⊃. The formula (γ) is true when γ is true of every possible valuation in the
semantic structure. Other probabilistic connectives (,∪,∩,≈) are introduced as
abbreviations. For instance, ( ξ) stands for (ξ⊃⊥ ). We shall also use (γ) as an
abbreviation for (((¬ γ))). Please note that the  and  are not modalities 9 .
We also use any algebraic real number as a constant since the language of EPPL
has enough expressiveness to specify these constants. For instance,
√
2 ≤ y1 can
be written as (y2y2 = (1 + 1) ∩ y2 ≥ 0) ⊃ y2 ≤ y1. We will use subtraction and
division freely since they can also be expressed in EPPL, for instance x/y = −2 can
be written as ((z + (1 + 1) = 0) ∩ ((y = 0))) ⊃ x = y · z. Finally, the conditional
probability term (
∫
γ1|γ2) is an abbreviation of (
∫
(γ1 ∧ γ2))/(
∫
γ2).
The notion of occurrence of a term p and a probabilistic state formula ξ1 in the
probabilistic state formula ξ can be easily deﬁned. The notion of replacing zero or
more occurrences of probability terms and probabilistic formulas can be similarly
deﬁned. For the sake of clarity, we shall often drop parentheses in formulas and
terms if it does not lead to ambiguity.
Example 2.2 Consider again the variant of the Russian roulette described in Ex-
ample 2.1. Stating that the coin is fair can be expressed by (
∫
h = 1/2). We can
also say the bullet is shot only if the outcome of the coin is heads by (b ⇒ h).
Similarly, the gambler is dead only if the outcome of the coin toss is heads and the
bullet is shot, which can be expressed by (d⇒ b ∧ h). Finally, the fact that the
probability of the bullet being shot is 1/6 can be captured by (
∫
b|h) = 1/6.
2.2 Semantics
Given V ⊆ V, the extent of a classical formula γ in V is deﬁned as |γ|V = {v ∈ V :
v c γ}, where c is the satisfaction relation for classical propositional logic. For
interpreting the probabilistic variables, we need the concept of an assignment. An
assignment ρ is a map such that ρ(y) ∈ R for each y ∈ Y.
Given a probabilistic structure (V, μ) and an assignment ρ, the denotation of
probabilistic terms and satisfaction of probabilistic state formulas are deﬁned in-
ductively as follows.
• Denotation of probability terms
· [[0]]ρ(V,μ) = 0
· [[1]]ρ(V,μ) = 1
· [[y]]ρ(V,μ) = ρ(y)
· [[(∫ γ)]]ρ(V,μ) = μ(|γ|V )
· [[p1 + p2]]ρ(V,μ) = [[p1]]ρ(V,μ) + [[p2]]ρ(V,μ)
· [[p1p2]]ρ(V,μ) = [[p1]]ρ(V,μ) × [[p2]]ρ(V,μ)
• Satisfaction of probabilistic formulas
· (V, μ)ρ  (γ) iﬀ v c γ for every v ∈ V
· (V, μ)ρ  (p1 ≤ p2) iﬀ V = ∅ implies ([[p1]]ρ(V,μ) ≤ [[p2]]ρ(V,μ))
9 We do not have formulas such as (γ).
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· (V, μ)ρ  ⊥
· (V, μ)ρ  (ξ1 ⊃ ξ2) iﬀ (V, μ)ρ  ξ2 or (V, μ)ρ  ξ1
The formula (γ) is satisﬁed only if all v ∈ V satisfy γ. The formula (p1 ≤ p2) is
satisﬁed if the term denoted by p1 is less than p2. The formula (ξ1 ⊃ ξ2) is satisﬁed
by a semantic model if either ξ1 is not satisﬁed by the model or ξ2 is satisﬁed by
the model. Entailment is deﬁned as usual: Ξ entails ξ (written Ξ  ξ) if (V, μ)ρ  ξ
whenever (V, μ)ρ  ξ0 for each ξ0 ∈ Ξ.
Please note that an assignment ρ is suﬃcient to interpret a useful sub-language
of probabilistic state formulas:
κ := (a ≤ a) ⊥  (κ⊃ κ)
a := 0  1  x  (a + a)  (aa).
Henceforth, the terms of this sub-language will be called analytical terms and the
formulas will be called analytical formulas.
2.3 Model–checking EPPL
For the model–checking procedure we assume that the probabilistic structure and
assignment are represented using a ﬂoating point data structure. We assume that a
probabilistic structure (V, μ) for Φ propositional symbols is modelled by a V -array
of real numbers; the size of V is at most 2n with n = |Φ|. We also assume that
the basic arithmetical operations take O(1) time. Moreover, we assume that we use
only a ﬁnite number of variables Y and that assignment is a vector of real number
of size |Y|.
We also assume the deﬁnition of the length of a classical formula γ or a prob-
abilistic formula ξ as the number of symbols required to write the formula. The
length of a formula ξ (classical or probabilistic) is given by |ξ|.
Given a probabilistic structure (V, μ), assignment ρ and a probabilistic formula
ξ, the ﬁrst step is to evaluate all the terms occurring in ξ. For the probability terms∫
γ, the evaluation takes |V | · |γ| steps as we check the set of valuations that satisfy
γ. Once the terms are evaluated, the model–checking algorithm is straightforward.
Theorem 2.3 Assuming that all basic arithmetical operations take unit time, there
is an algorithm O(|ξ| · |V |) to decide if a probabilistic structure over Φ and an
assignment ρ satisfy ξ.
Proof. First notice that the terms that take longer to evaluate are those of the type
(
∫
γ) and (γ). The number of terms of type (
∫
γ) is bounded by |ξ|. To evaluate
one of these terms we require O(|V |) time corresponding to traveling throughout all
the valuations satisfying γ and summing all the associated probabilities. So, com-
puting all (
∫
γ) terms takes O(|ξ|.|V |) time. The same expression will be obtained
to check the satisfaction of (γ).
P. Baltazar et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 190 (2007) 95–110 99
After these values are obtained, the remaining computation (comparing terms,
negating a boolean value, and making implications between boolean values) takes
at most O(|ξ|) time. Hence, the total time to decide if a if a probabilistic structure
over Φ and an assignment ρ satisfy ξ is O(|ξ|.|V |+ |ξ|) = O(|ξ|.|V |). 
Clearly, since in the worst case the probability distribution will span all possible
valuations, we have |V | = 2n where n = |Φ|. Observe that in many cases the set
of possible valuations is small and it is possible to describe this set in a compact
manner, as well as the probabilities associated, we will return to this discussion
when we discuss the model–checking procedure of the temporal extension of the
logic.
2.4 Axiomatisation of EPPL
The axiomatisation of the EPPL logic presented here relies entirely on that in [9]
and will be presented in a summarised way. We need two new concepts for the
axiomatisation, namely the notions of probabilistic tautology and of valid analytical
formulas.
Consider propositional formulas built from a countable set of propositional sym-
bols Q using the classical connectives ⊥ and →. A probabilistic formula ξ is said to
be a probabilistic tautology if there exists a propositional tautology β over Q, and
a map σ from Q to the set of probabilistic state formulas, such that ξ coincides
with βpσ (where βpσ is the probabilistic formula obtained from β by replacing all
occurrences of ⊥ by ⊥ , → by ⊃ and q ∈ Q by σ(q)). For instance, the probabilistic
formula ((y1 ≤ y2) ⊃ (y1 ≤ y2)) is tautological (obtained, for example, from the
propositional tautology q → q).
As noted in Section 2.2 an assignment is enough to interpret all analytical for-
mulas. We say that κ is a valid analytical formula if for any real closed ﬁeld K
and assignment ρ, κ is true for ρ. Clearly, a valid analytical formula holds for all
semantic structures of EPPL. It is a well-known fact from the theory of quantiﬁer
elimination [17,3] that the set of valid analytical formulas so deﬁned is decidable
over algebraic ordered ﬁelds. Moreover, since the real numbers consitute a repre-
sentative model of algebraic ordered ﬁelds (that is, if there exists a solution for a
systems of inequations written with the terms of EPPL in an algebraic order ﬁeld,
there is also a solution for the real numbers), the decidability result extends over
the real numbers. We shall not go into details of this result as we want to focus
exclusively on reasoning about probabilistic aspects.
The axioms and inference rules of EPPL are listed below.
• Axioms
· [CTaut]  (γ) for each valid formula γ;
· [PTaut]  ξ for each probabilistic tautology ξ
· [Lift⇒]  (((γ1 ⇒ γ2))⊃ (γ1 ⊃γ2))
· [Eqv⊥]  ((⊥)≈⊥ )
· [Ref∧]  (((γ1) ∩ (γ2))⊃ ((γ1 ∧ γ2)))
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· [RCF]  κ{|y/p|} where κ is a valid analytical formula, y and p are sequences
of probability variables and probability terms respectively
· [Meas∅]  ((∫⊥) = 0)
· [FAdd]  (((∫(γ1 ∧ γ2)) = 0)⊃ ((
∫
(γ1 ∨ γ2)) = (
∫
γ1) + (
∫
γ2)))
· [Prob]  ((∫) = 1)
· [Mon]  (((γ1 ⇒ γ2))⊃ ((
∫
γ1) ≤ (
∫
γ2)))
• Inference rules
· [CMP] (γ1), ((γ1 ⇒ γ2))  (γ2)
· [PMP] ξ1, (ξ1 ⊃ ξ2)  ξ2
The axiom CTaut says that if γ is a valid classical formula then (γ) is an
axiom. The axiom PTaut says that a probabilistic tautology is an axiom. Since
the set of valid classical formulas and the set of probabilistic tautologies are both
recursive, there is no need to spell out the details of tautological reasoning.
The axioms Lift⇒, Eqv⊥ and Ref∧ are suﬃcient to relate (local) classical state
reasoning and (global) probabilistic tautological reasoning.
The term κ{|y/p|} in the axiom RCF is the term obtained by substituting all
occurrences of yi in κ by pi. The axiom RCF says that if κ is a valid analytical
formula, then any formula obtained by replacing variables with probability terms is
a tautology. We refrain from spelling out the details as the set of valid analytical
formulas is recursive.
The axiom Meas∅ says that the measure of empty set is 0. The axiom FAdd is
the ﬁnite additivity of the measures. The axiom Mon relates the classical connec-
tives with probability measures and is a consequence of monotonicity of measures.
The axiom Prob says that the measure is a probability measure.
The inference rules CMP and PMP are the modus ponens for classical and
probabilistic implication respectively.
As usual we say that a set of formulas Γ derives ξ, written Γ  ξ, if we can
build a derivation of ξ from axioms and the inference rules using formulas in Γ as
hypothesis.
Theorem 2.4 EPPL is sound and weakly complete. Moreover, the set of theorems
is recursive.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that EPPL logic present here is a sublan-
guage of that presented in [9], for which the corresponding axiomatisation is proved
to be sound and weakly complete. Hence, for further details look at [9]. 
3 The Computation Tree Extension - EpCTL
In this section we deﬁne the computation tree extension to EPPL, which we call
exogenous probabilistic computation tree logic (EpCTL). The idea is to consider
several probabilistic structures together with a transition relation between them,
in other words, a Kripke structure whose nodes are probability structures. This
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structure is particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it captures the idea,
which arises in the study of probabilistic transition systems, that the state space
should be described as a distribution of classical states [30,14,9]. Secondly, it is
a step towards reasoning about quantum systems, since in such systems a state
is described as a probabilistic ensemble of pure quantum states (cf. mixed states,
density operators). We will explore both aspects in Section 4 by presenting two
detailed examples.
We proceed to present the syntax of EpCTL.
3.1 Syntax
The syntax of EpCTL can be easily obtained from the syntax of EPPL. The idea
is that at the level of probabilistic state formulas, we also introduce the usual CTL
modalities. For the sake of clarity, we recall the deﬁnition of classical formulas and
probability terms.
• Classical formulas
γ := Φ ⊥  (γ ⇒ γ)
• Probability terms
p := 0  1  y  (
∫
γ)  (p + p)  (p p)
• Exogenous probabilistic computation tree logic formulas
· δ := (γ)  (p ≤ p) ⊥  (δ ⊃ δ)  (EXδ)  (AFδ)  (E[δUδ])
The intuitive semantics of the temporal modalities is similar to that in classical
CTL. The modalities are composed by two symbols, where the ﬁrst one is chosen
among E or A, and the second one among X, F, G and the bi-modality U. The second
symbol is used for temporal reasoning: X stands for next; F for sometime in the
future; G for always in the future; and U for until. The ﬁrst symbol quantiﬁes over
all computation paths: an existential (E - for there exists) path or a universal (A -
for all) paths. The combination of the two symbols can be easily understood. For
example, the formula EXδ holds in a probability structure (V, p) if there exists a next
structure of (V, p) (that is, a structure reachable from (V, p) with a single transition)
that satisﬁes δ. As usual, all CTL modalities are obtained as abbreviations from
EX,AF and EU.
• (AX δ) for EX( δ);
• (EF δ) for (E[( ⊥ )Uδ]);
• (AG δ) for (EF( δ));
• (EG δ) for (AF( δ));
• A[δ1Uδ2] for (E[( δ2)U( δ1 ∩ δ2)]) ∩ ((EG( δ2))).
Example 3.1 Consider again the Russian roulette variant from Example 2.1 to-
gether with some temporal primitives. First, we will like to state that the bullet
can not be shot before the outcome of the coin is heads, which can be expressed as
A[((
∫
b) = 0)U((
∫
h) > 0)]. Suppose that the gambler is always playing this game
alone, clearly the probability of killing himself tends asymptotically to 1, we can
P. Baltazar et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 190 (2007) 95–110102
capture this statement with ((x < 1)⊃ AF((∫ d) > x)).
3.2 Semantics
A probabilistic Kripke structure is a pair (P, R) where P is a set of probabilistic
structures and R ⊆ P × P is a total transition relation, that is, for any (V, μ) ∈ P
there exists (V ′, μ′) such that (V, μ) R (V ′, μ′). The notion of probabilistic Kripke
structure is very general, and, as we shall see, it is capable of capturing Markov tran-
sitions (and more) as well as systems with both non–deterministic and probabilistic
transitions.
Example 3.2 Consider the Russian roulette from Example 2.1, and consider that
the gambler plays the game twice and then, if alive, halts. The probabilistic Kripke
structure is such that all probability structures involved have the set of admissible
valuations V = {∅, {h}, {h, b, d}}. Assume that the initial distribution μ0 is μ(∅) =
1. The probability distribution over V evolves accordingly to the following stochastic
matrix
M =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
2
5
12
1
12
1
2
5
12
1
12
0 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
so, assuming that the gambler’s only choice is to play twice and then halt if alive,
we have that μ0 R μ1 and μ1(∅) = 1/2, μ1({h}) = 5/12 and μ1({h, b, d}) = 1/12;
moreover, μ1 R μ2, with μ2(∅) = 11/24, μ2({h}) = 55/144 and μ2({h, b, d}) =
23/144; and ﬁnally μ2 R μ2.
The interpretation of probabilistic terms is deﬁned as before. The satisfaction
of a temporal formula is deﬁned over a probabilistic Kripke structure (P, R), a
probabilistic structure (V, μ) ∈ P and an assignment ρ.
• (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  (γ) iﬀ (V, μ), ρ  (γ);
• (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  (p1 ≤ p2) iﬀ (V, μ), ρ  (p1 ≤ p2);
• (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  ⊥ ;
• (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  (δ1 ⊃ δ2) iﬀ (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  δ1 or (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  δ2;
• (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  (EXδ) iﬀ (P, R), (V ′, μ′), ρ  δ with (V, μ) R (V, μ);
• (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  (AFδ) iﬀ for all path π over R starting in (V, μ) there exist
k ∈ N such that (P, R), πk , ρ  δ;
• (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  (E[δ1Uδ2]) iﬀ there exist path π over R starting in (V, μ) and
k ∈ N such that (P, R), πk , ρ  δ2 and (P, R), πi, ρ  δ1 for every i ≤ k;
where πi denotes the i-element of the path π.
We say that (P, R)  δ iﬀ (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  δ for all (V, μ) ∈ P and assignment
ρ.
Example 3.3 Consider the probabilistic Kripke structure (P, R) of Example 3.2.
The structure satisﬁes the property that the probability of dying is non decreasing,
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that is, (P, R)  (((∫ d) = x)⊃ (AG((∫ d) ≥ x))).
The relation of EpCTL to PCTL
EpCTLis related to the logic PCTL proposed by Hansson and Jonsson [16]. The
PRISM tool [19,20] is a symbolic model-checker for PCTL. There is a fundamental
diﬀerence between the semantics of EpCTL and PCTL; whereas PCTL enables rea-
soning about distributions over paths in a probabilistic transition system, EpCTL
is designed for reasoning about how a probability distribution over a ﬁnite set of
propositional symbols changes over time. The latter approach is particularly advan-
tageous for reasoning about certain types of systems, such as distributed randomised
algorithms. Depending on the application, it can be better or worse to model a given
property using distributions over paths or over the propositional symbols, since both
approaches are valid, but quite diﬀerent. Hence, the PCTL formula AG>qϕ states
that, for any choice of the scheduler, the measure of paths satisfying Gϕ is greater
than q. On the other hand the EpCTL formula AG(
∫
ϕ > q) means that for any
choice of the scheduler, all the state distributions reached are such that the prob-
ability of ϕ holding is greater than q. Given that in PCTL the probabilities are
endogenous in the modalities, it does not seem to be possible to express some more
sophisticated types of property, such as: AG((
∫
ϕ1 ·
∫
ϕ2) > q). It is possible to
devise a mapping from probabilistic transition systems to probabilistic Kripke struc-
tures using a construction that involves blind schedulers, but we will not elaborate
on this here. Investigating the connections between the semantics of EpCTL and of
other logics is certainly a direction for future work.
3.3 Model–checking EpCTL
We now address the problem of model–checking a temporal formula. Following the
usual model–checking technique for CTL, the goal is to compute the set
Sat(P,R),ρ(δ) := {(V, μ) ∈ P : (P, R), (V, μ), ρ  δ}
for a probabilistic Kripke structure (P, R), assignment ρ and formula δ. This is
called the global model–checking problem. Before presenting the model–checking al-
gorithm, it is useful to introduce some notation for relations, namely in the context
of a probabilistic Kripke structure (P, R). We denote by R−1 the inverse relation
of R, that is, (V, μ)R−1(V ′, μ′) iﬀ (V ′, μ′)R(V, μ). Given a set of probabilistic stru-
cutures X ⊆ P, we denote by RX the set {(V, μ) ∈ P : there exists (V ′, μ′) ∈ X
such that (V ′, μ′)R(V, μ)}. We are now able to present a model–checking algorithm,
adapted from the usual algorithm for CTL:
(i) Sat(P,R),ρ(γ) = {(V, μ) ∈ P : (V, μ), ρ  (γ)};
(ii) Sat(P,R),ρ(p1 ≤ p2) = {(V, μ) ∈ P : (V, μ), ρ  (p1 ≤ p2)};
(iii) Sat(P,R),ρ(δ1 ⊃ δ2) = (P \ Sat(P,R),ρ(δ1) ∪ Sat(P,R),ρ(δ2);
(iv) Sat(P,R),ρ(EXδ) = R
−1Sat(P,R),ρ(δ);
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(v) Sat(P,R),ρ(AFδ) = FixedPoint[λX.F(AFδ)(X), Sat(P,R),ρ(δ)] with
F(AFδ)(X) = X ∪ {(V, μ) ∈ P : R{(V, μ)} ⊆ X};
(vi) Sat(P,R),ρ(E[δ1Uδ2]) = FixedPoint[λX.FE[δ1Uδ2](X), Sat(P,R),ρ(δ2)] with
FE[δ1Uδ2](X) = X ∪ (Sat(P,R),ρ(δ1) ∩R−1X).
In general, a probabilistic Kripke structure requires exponential space (over the
number of propositional symbols) due to the exponential spanning of probabilities on
the distribution over the valuations. For this reason, the model–checking algorithm
takes exponential time on the number of propositional symbols, but it is polynomial
on the size of the probabilistic Kripke structure and the complexity of the formula.
Theorem 3.4 Assuming that all basic arithmetical operations take unit time, the
model–checking algorithm for EpCTL takes O(|δ|2 · |P|2 ·2n) time for inputs (P, R), ρ
and δ, where δ is written with n propositional symbols.
Proof. The propositional CTL model–checking algorithm takes O(|δ| · |P|2) (see
[10] for a detailed analysis). So, if we consider each (γ) and p1 ≤ p2 to be a
propositional symbol, the time complexity of the algorithm would be O(|δ| · |P|2).
Finally, since checking if these formulas are satisﬁed by a (P, μ) and ρ takes O(|δ|·2n)
(c.f. Theorem 2.3) we derive the desired upper bound. Recall that we consider all
arithmetic computations to be O(1) by using ﬂoating point representation for the
real numbers. 
It is well known that a slightly better algorithm can be obtained if EG is taken
as a basic modality instead of AF, but we refrain from doing so here. Although the
algorithm is exponential in the worst case, it assumes that a probability distribution
over valuations is encoded as a vector of probabilities. Clearly, for particular rele-
vant cases, there are much more eﬃcient and compact encodings; we are currently
investigating which probability distributions can be encoded eﬃciently.
4 Illustrative Examples
In order to demonstrate the expressiveness of EpCTL, we consider a couple of exam-
ples from the literature, starting with a model of the contract-signing protocol due
to Ben-Or et al. [6]. We then consider a simple example of a protocol from the area
of quantum cryptography, the quantum one–time pad [1], noting that this particular
protocol may be modelled entirely in a probabilistic setting, and its properties for-
malised in a classical probabilistic (as opposed to speciﬁcally quantum) formalism.
4.1 A Contract Signing Protocol
The problem of contract signing is to ﬁnd a way of getting two users, A and B,
to commit to a contract C in such a way that neither party may falsely convince
the other that the former has signed. In other words, A and B must sign the
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contract together, without one party gaining any advantage over the other. The
traditional solution to the problem is for A and B to sign C simultaneously, but
this is only possible if A and B are in physical proximity. Assuming that A and B
are spatially separated, the only way for contract signing to be achieved is through
a communication protocol, although it is likely that, at diﬀerent stages of such a
protocol, one party will have a relative advantage over the other. The objective of
a “fair” contract signing protocol, such as the one proposed by Ben-Or et al. [6]
(henceforth referred to simply as the BGMR protocol) is to constrain this relative
advantage so that it remains within speciﬁc bounds tolerated and agreed upon by
both users.
The BGMR protocol assumes the setting of a network of users (we focus only
on the two user case) with a signature scheme in operation. Only user U is assumed
capable of producing U’s signature on message m (unforgeability) and any other
user is assumed capable of verifying the validity of U’s signature on m (universal
veriﬁability). The protocol assumes that neither user A nor user B wants to be
committed to contract C unless the other user is, and makes it possible for A and
B to sign C by exchanging commitments. The notion of fairness for the protocol
is deﬁned as the property that, the conditional probability with which “B is not
privileged” given that “A is privileged” is always small. Formally, the BGMR
protocol is said to be (v, )–fair, this being deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.1 A contract signing protocol is (v, )–fair for A if the following holds,
for any contract C, when A follows the protocol properly: At any step of the protocol
in which the probability that “B is privileged” is greater than v, the conditional
probability that “A is not privileged” given that “B is privileged” is at most .
If A and B are assumed to be dishonest, then a third party – a judge – must
be invoked during the protocol in order to provide an independent judgement as
to whether the contract is to be considered binding for both users. During the
protocol, A and B exchange signed messages of the following form:
m = (C, p, U) = “With probability p, the contract C shall be valid.
Signed, User U . ”
When message m is received, the recipient is said to be privileged with probability
p, meaning that invocation of the judge will result in him ruling that contract
C is binding to A and B with probability p. If the protocol does not terminate
successfully by a pre–agreed date D, one of the two users invokes an early stopping
procedure.
We are now ready to state the BGMR protocol in detail. Steps 1–5 are for
initialization of protocol parameters.
(i) Parties A and B agree who goes ﬁrst and set a termination date D. We assume
that A is to go ﬁrst.
(ii) Party A chooses the conditional probability v that “B is privileged” while “A
is not privileged.”
(iii) Party A chooses the parameter α > 1 such that, the conditional probability
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that “A is privileged” given that “B is privileged” is at least 1
α
.
(iv) Party B chooses β > 1 such that, the conditional probability that “B is privi-
leged” given that “A is privileged” is at least 1
β
.
(v) The protocol is initialised with λA = λB = 0. The symbol λA stores the
probability mentioned in the message last sent from A, and similarly λB stores
the probability mentioned in the message last transmitted from B.
(vi) A and B perform the following procedures alternately:
A-step. User A denotes the probability mentioned in the last message re-
ceived by p. A then checks whether p  λA. If so, then A sets λA :=
max(v,min(1, p · α)). Otherwise, A assumes the protocol has been termi-
nated. A then transmits message (C, λA, A) to B.
B-step. User B denotes the probability mentioned in the last message received
by p. B then checks whether p  λB . If so, then B sets λB := min(1, p · β).
Otherwise, B assumes the protocol has been terminated. B then transmits
message (C, λB , B) to B.
The details of the judge’s procedure, and of the early stopping procedure, are to
be found in [6]. An analysis of the protocol has been performed using the PRISM
model-checker by Norman and Shmatikov [27].
The essential point about the BGMR protocol is that it ensures a speciﬁed degree
of fairness, characterised by the constants v and . At the end of the protocol, both
parties need to be privileged. We formalise the notion of (v, )–fairness using EpCTL
in what follows.
We establish the set Φ = {ϕA, ϕB} of propositional constants, where ϕA corre-
sponds to the truth of the event “A is privileged,” and similarly ϕB is true if “B is
privileged.” To express the fairness property, we regard the protocol parameter  as
a real variable, namely a member of the set Y deﬁned in Section 2. The probability
v which party A ﬁxes in step (ii) above may be expressed as the following term in
EpCTL :
v =
(∫
ϕB |(¬ϕA)
)
In steps (iii) and (iv) of the protocol, parties A and B ﬁx the parameters α and
β respectively such that the following EpCTL properties are true:
(∫
ϕA|ϕB
)

1
α
(1)
(∫
ϕB |ϕA
)

1
β
(2)
The property of (v, )–fairness may be expressed thus:
AG
(((∫
ϕB
)
> v
) ⊃ ((∫ (¬ϕA)|ϕB
)
 
))
that is to say, in all paths of the protocol, the probability that “A is not privileged”
given that B is, assuming that the probability of “B being privileged” is greater
than v, remains less than . Note that we are using the comparators >, freely;
these may be expressed in terms of the  operator in the formal syntax of EpCTL.
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4.2 Quantum One Time Pad
A qubit is the basic memory unit in quantum computation (just as a bit is the
basic memory unit in classical computation). The state of a qubit is a pair (α, β) of
complex numbers such that |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. A quantum one time pad [1] encrypts a
qubit using two key (classical) bits in a secure way: observing the encrypted qubit
yields two results, both with equal probability. In the special case that α and β
are real numbers one bit key ϕK suﬃces. If ϕK = 1 then the qubit is encrypted as
the pair (β,−α), otherwise it remains the same. We consider that a real number
α is encoded using ﬂoating point representation, namely a vector of propositional
symbols ϕα1 . . . ϕ
α
n which we denote just by ϕ
α. We will abbreviate by α = β the
classical formula (ϕα1 ⇔ ϕβ1 ) ∧ . . . ∧ (ϕαn ⇔ ϕβn).
The following program simulates this process by ﬁrst generating a random key
and then encrypting the qubit (α, β):
(i) Let ϕK := outcome of a fair Bernoulli trial;
(ii) If (ϕK = 1) then
(a) γ := α
(b) α := β
(c) β := −γ
Assume that the initial values of α and β are c and d respectively (with c = d).
It follows from quantum information theory that in order to prove the security
of the quantum one-time pad, it suﬃces to show that the probability after the
encryption of α being c is 12 (and hence of α being d is also
1
2). We can use our logic
and model checking procedure to show the above by considering the probabilistic
Kripke structure induced by the encryption program. Assume that the program
induces a single transition in the Kripke structure, and from that point on the
probability distribution over the states remains the same. Therefore, the security
of the quantum one-time pad is equivalent to checking that all initial states fulﬁll
((α = c ∧ β = d ∧ (¬(c = d)))) ⊃ AX((∫(α = c)) = 12).
5 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a probabilistic branching-time logic, EpCTL, which
may be regarded as a temporal extension of the exogenous probabilistic state logic
EPPL. We have stated the syntax and semantics of EPPL, considered the model–
checking problem for formulas in this state logic, and presented an axiomatisation
for it. We described the EpCTL extension, stating syntax, semantics, and model–
checking issues in an analogous way to EPPL. The expressiveness of EpCTL was
discussed, and an axiomatisation was given. We demonstrated the use of EpCTL as
a means of expressing properties of two security protocols: a classical probabilistic
contract signing protocol, and the quantum one–time pad.
Our approach has been inspired by earlier work by Halpern, and we expect
the probabilistic temporal logic EpCTL to serve as a useful alternative to related
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classical logics such as PCTL. Future work will include reﬁning the axiomatisation
of EpCTL, considering possible improvements to the model–checking algorithm, and
implementing the algorithm. Further work on case studies is necessary, especially
with a view to classifying and verifying the types of properties which typically arise
in security.
We hope this work will serve as a basis for ongoing work in developing an exoge-
nous, temporal quantum logic for model–checking general quantum protocols. A
quantum state logic, exogenous quantum propositional logic (EQPL) was proposed
in [23]; we intend to provide a temporal extension of that logic, extending the tech-
niques described in the present paper. Thus we have the necessary ingredients for
building a dedicated model–checking tool for the analysis of quantum cryptographic
and communication systems, which is one of our long-term goals.
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